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Abstract
In this document we discuss the applicability
of speech act theory as a theoretical foundation for the design of information technology
(IT). We pay special attention to the adaptation speech act theory has undergone when
applied in the IT-field. One question we address concerns what happens when we import
passive descriptive theories from other disciplines and use them as a basis in active design. The basic standpoint is that speech act
theory may be useful, but only if one is aware
of its shortcomings. By surveying various
criticisms directed towards speech act based
design along with extensions and alternative
approaches we attempt to pinpoint these
shortcomings. Our aim is to identify breakdowns of speech act based methods and discuss the need for further adaptation. This is
done by the use of a framework, also presented in the chapter.
Key Words: Speech act theory, language/action approach, IT design, IT development.

1. Introduction
In the field of IT-design the dominating
perspective on IT-artifacts has been an
information storage paradigm. Over the
course of time, the social and communicative aspects of IT-usage have become
more stressed. In this process speech act
theory has come to play an important
role (Auramäki 1988, Auramäki et al.
1988, 1992a, 1992b, De Cindio et al.
1986, De Michelis & Grasso 1994,
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Flores et al. 1988, Kensing & Winograd
1991, Medina-Mora et al. 1992,
Winograd 1988, Winograd & Flores
1986). From the early applications in the
Coordinator, its use has spread to industrial practice in the Workflow management area. The more widespread use of
speech act theory has become, the more
it has also been debated and criticized
(Bowers 1993, Bowers & Churcher
1988, CSCW—An International Journal,
Vol. 3, 1995, Dietz & Widdershoven
1992, Suchman 1994, Winograd 1994).
A part of this criticism is not specifically
about speech act theory, but concerns
general issues about designing and using
IT in an organizational context. There
exists a need to create an overview of
this criticism. Exactly what is wrong
with speech act theory? Can it be adapted
to overcome some of the criticisms?
In “How To Do Things With Words”,
the posthumously published lectures of
J. L. Austin, the view that language is
only a means to assert propositions about
the world was attacked. Austin recognized that truth conditional semantics
was troublesome for certain kinds of utterances that are not descriptive, but rather constitute actions. The saying of certain words changes the world, rather than
merely describing it. The failure of traditional semantic theories to deal with this
problem he called the descriptive fallacy.
“It was for too long the assumption of
philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some
state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’,
which it must do either truly or falsely.”
(Austin 1962)

Austin called these special kinds of utterances performatives (e.g. baptising, marrying). Related to performative utterances is a special class of performative verbs

(e.g. apologize, criticize, approve). Performatives are not judged to be true or
false, rather they are happily or unhappily performed. To be happily performed
certain conditions must be fulfilled (felicity conditions), e.g. to give a sentence
in court, the act must be performed by a
judge.
To say something is, according to
Austin, to perform three simultaneous
acts: one locutionary act, one illocutionary act and one perlocutionary act. The
locutionary act is the act of uttering a
sentence with a sense and a reference.
Whenever we perform a locutionary act,
we also perform an illocutionary act, according to conventions of language associated with the act, e.g. urging, warning
et cetera. Saying something will also typically cause certain consequential effects
upon thoughts, beliefs or actions of the
hearer. Bringing about these effects is to
perform a perlocutionary act, e.g. persuade, alarm et cetera. According to
Austin, illocutionary acts are conventional, but perlocutionary acts are not.
That is, the former could be made explicit by a performative formula, but the latter could not. “I argue” and “I warn you”
are possible performative constructions,
but we cannot say “I convince you” and
“I alarm you”.
While Austin’s theory was open ended and Platonic, Searle systematized it,
made it formal and Aristotelian, with a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions, constitutive of a basic categorization of speech acts. He identified five
fundamental illocutionary points, i.e.
things possible to do through language
(Searle & Vanderveken 1985, Searle
1969, 1979).
Searle added the notion of indirect
speech acts, i.e. a certain speech act
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could be expressed in a number of ways
without reference to explicit performatives. He also based his notion of illocutionary point more on the intentions of
the speaker, than on conventionalized
meaning, claiming that any analysis of illocutionary acts must capture intentional
as well as conventional aspects (Searle
1979) and the relations between them.
1.1. Communicative Aspects of ITUsage
In the field of IT-design the prevailing
language perspective is a referential one.
The most fundamental activities of system design are seen as the mapping of a
universe of discourse into abstract symbolic models and databases. The “descriptive fallacy” of methods and techniques for IT-design has been attacked
by Lyytinen (1985, 1987), and the limitations of these assumptions (also founding prevailing views of artificial intelligence) to generate new kinds of designs,
were put forth by Winograd & Flores
(1986). A set of methods, techniques and
software artifacts has now evolved that
may be seen as a kind of “communication paradigm”, in the way Winograd
and Flores argued for a “new foundation
for design” (Winograd & Flores 1986).
A way to state this impact of speech act
theory is found in (Whitaker 1992):
“The greatest impact of alternative linguistic models on IT has been that of
Austin’s theory, as elaborated by Searle
and evangelized by Winograd & Flores
(1986).”

This new orientation in design is directed
towards the development of computer
software for organizational communication and action. Organizations are
viewed as networks of commitments and

undertakings (Flores et al. 1988). The
speech act based approach has been explored, discussed, and criticized extensively. Pioneering work was made by
Winograd, Flores et al. (Flores et al.
1988, Medina-Mora et al. 1992,
Winograd 1988, Winograd & Flores
1986) and Auramäki, Lyytinen et al.
(Auramäki et al. 1988, 1992a, 1992b).
Several broader views on the design
of IT and its role in the context of work,
collaboration and communication also
exist, e.g. Mechanisms of interaction
(Schmidt 1993, 1994), Coordination theory (Malone & Crowston 1990), and Activity theory (Kuuti 1991). There are also
several approaches focusing on work
practice and workers/users influence on
the design of new technology and its usage in work settings, e.g. Participatory
design (Kyng 1995, Grønbæck et al.
1997), and the Tools approach (Ehn
1988). Other approaches are influenced
by sociology and anthropology such as
ethnography in system design (Hughes
et al. 1994). The work of Blomberg et al.
(1997) are also examples of this. To
these we could add recent approaches
such as ethnocritical heuristics (Muller
1997), and aesthetic aspects (Ehn et al.
1997).
According to these broader views, a
pure communicative view of IT-design,
as we discuss in this paper, may have severe shortcomings. Still, a communicative or language oriented view, may be
rewarding. A large part of work is performed through language, and IT is used
to support communicative activities to a
considerable extent. Besides speech act
theory, several directions in the study of
language usage and communication are
available from disciplines such as linguistics, language philosophy, social
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psychology, sociology, and anthropology, e.g. social interactionism, ethnography of communication, and conversation
analysis to mention but a few (Schiffrin
1994).
However, we believe speech act theory has played a particularly important
role in the context of IT-design. At the
same time it appears that it needs to be
used with caution and to be adapted for
an IT context. Consequently we have set
out to investigate how far speech act theory might guide us in design, and to reflect upon what the consequences of using it might be.
To investigate speech act theory as a
foundation for design, we must address
the boundaries and potential breakdowns
it may posit in its new context. In order
to interpret and understand these limits,
we need a framework going beyond the
communicative perspective, giving hints
to other aspects listed above. This paper
presents such a framework, involving
also dimensions that are not covered by
speech act based design. The problem at
hand concerns articulating communicative aspects of work and IT-usage. When
we view IT as a mediator and support for
communication, how should we then apply communicative theories in modeling
and design? When is it appropriate to apply a speech act perspective, and when
not? In what ways should one extend it?
A natural point of departure for this discussion is the generic schema, conversation for action.
1.2. Conversation for Action
The generic schema of conversation for
action presented by Winograd, Flores, et
al. (Winograd 1988, Winograd & Flores
1986, Medina-Mora et al. 1992) has
widely influenced the areas of Workflow

management, Computer supported collaborative work (CSCW), and Business
process re-engineering. A conversation
is in this approach a coordinated, coherent sequence of language acts. At each
point in the conversation, there is only a
small set of possible action types. The
idea is that whenever a task is being performed for a customer there is a generic
pattern of speech acts that occurs. The
sequence typically starts with a request
from the customer, then the performer
makes a promise, and reports completion, which in turn may either be declined or declared complete by the customer. A discourse may thus be defined
in a state transition diagram (figure 1),
where each state-transition corresponds
to a speech act.
FIGURE 1. State-transition diagram for a

workflow

A: Request B: Promise
1
2
3
B: Counter
B: Decline
A: Cancel

A: Decline
Report
A: Declare
Complete
4
5
B: Report
Completion
B: Cancel
7

A: Cancel

A: Counter A: Accept
A: Cancel
A: Cancel
8 B: Cancel 6
9

A set of methods and software products,
have emerged that use a modeling approach of business activities, similar to
the one proposed by Flores et al. For
each task there is a workflow, which includes communication with the customer, according to the schema in figure 1.
This is illustrated as a basic workflow
loop with four phases (Figure 2) (Medina-Mora et al. 1992). A work activity is
in this view the fulfilment of commit-
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ments by a performer to the satisfaction
of a customer.

kind of activity, as proposed by Flores et
al.

FIGURE 2. Graphical representation of a
basic workflow loop
Preparation

Customer

Acceptance

Negotiation

Workflow

Performer

Performance

According to this view, any work activity
can be sequenced in four basic steps:
preparation: the customer makes a request, or the supplier makes an offer; negotiation: the parties establish a mutual
agreement of conditions of satisfaction;
performance: the supplier declares that
the undertaking is complete, and acceptance: the customer declares satisfaction.
Several circles can be interconnected
with links, such that a speech act in one
workflow may trigger one in another
workflow. In this way, one workflow can
be viewed as a sub flow to another workflow.
The customer/supplier metaphor has
been reified and objectified to a remarkable extent in literature on Business
process reengineering (see e.g. (Hammer
& Champy 1993, Keen 1991)). The basic
workflow loop is used as a means to articulate customer-supplier relations, with
customer satisfaction in focus. There is
always an identified customer and a performer, with the loop representing a particular action the performer agrees to
complete to the satisfaction of the customer. Problems may however arise
when this basic loop is applied to any

2. Themes in the Criticism of Speech
Acts
Speech act theory in the shape of conversation-for-action seems simple and attractive, but what is the price we have to
pay for this simplification of complex organizational reality? What is actually
happening when speech act theory is imported to the field of IT-design? What
objections might be raised and why?
It is possible to categorize the criticisms and discussions of speech act
based design in several ways. Some arguments are more philosophical in so far
as they concern the very nature of theoretical abstractions per se. Related to this
philosophical concern is the question of
how theoretical abstractions could be
used in the practice of IT-design.
Further arguments concern the limitations of the particular abstraction comprized by means of speech act theory.
These arguments are mainly matters of
expressiveness, and a concern for the important phenomena one may abstract
away when using speech acts as the abstraction instrument. This criticism is of
a more linguistic nature, addressing the
appropriateness of speech act theory to
give an account of pragmatic phenomena
inherent in real language usage. These
arguments concretize specific shortcomings of speech act theory and give valuable hints of break downs or needed extensions. They are generally of the form
“if we abstract by means of theory X, we
miss the important phenomenon Y”.
Together these two lines of criticisms
form a theme related to different means
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of theoretical abstractions, in general,
and in particular.
Furthermore, it is also possible to
identify a set of criticisms related to issues of power, control and rational design of work organizations and their ITsupport. This criticism concerns problems with rigid work design versus needs
for flexibility, and issues of power relations, such as authority and control versus autonomy. Designing for change and
flexibility will entail possibilities of
learning, while routinization may lead to
deskilling and alienation. This will raise
questions such as: “To what extent is it
possible and desirable to achieve a rational design of work? For whom is it desirable?” The need for skill, flexibility,
and social responsibility may prevent the
possibility of achieving a rationalistic
work design.
These sets of criticisms or themes,
form a framework for discussing and interpreting breakdowns and limitations of
speech act based design in particular, but
also IT-design in general:
1. The problems of theoretical abstractions
a. The insufficiency of any theoretical abstraction;
b. The insufficiancy of particular
abstractions, in this case speech
act theory;
2. The problems with a rationalistic
design of work (i.e. problems with
rigid design versus flexibility, and
global authority versus local autonomy).

3. Speech Acts on Trial
Sorting out the diverse strands of criticism, we start with the criticism directed
towards speech act theory per se, i.e. as a
philosophical and linguistic theory, and
related to that, the idea that a theory rejected within its own field should not be
imported to another field. An example of
the latter critique, i.e. “...that speech act
theory has been reified in the design and
implementation of IT artifacts after the
model has lost its currency in its parent
field.”, is found in (Whitaker 1992).
Such criticism, however, overlooks
the fact that a theory exported to a new
field often serves new purposes and
should be evaluated on new grounds. It
also ignores the adaptations that speech
act theory has undergone, when applied
in its new field. We will discuss some of
these changes in more detail below. As
we will see, several critics fail to see the
implications of this adaptation. (By this
we do not mean to say, that it is irrelevant
to examine critically the background of
imported theories. Rather we wish to
qualify such reflections by considering
also the changes that these theories undergo.)
3.1. The Insufficiency of Any
Theoretical Abstraction
One line of criticism against speech act
theory starts from the premise that human actions are always situated (Suchman 1987). According to Suchman
(1994), some criticisms of speech act
theory are based on insights concerning
the “circumstantially contingent character of meaning and intention”. Such insights are, however, invoked for many
different purposes. For some it denotes a
need to construct new theories about
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communication and language, as for
Suchman (1987). However, the reference
to the “contingent character of meaning”
is also related to a philosophical critique
of speech act theory. As such it has quite
different implications. It concerns the
(im)possibility of classifying the world
in an Aristotelian way. Is it possible at all
to give an absolute and final account of
speech acts in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions in the way Searle
does?
The core of this philosophical argument can be brought to light by contrasting the philosophy of Searle with that of
the later Wittgenstein (1958). Both Searle and Wittgenstein addressed meaning
theoretical issues. Wittgenstein claimed
that meaning is not a thing, such as the
referent or a speaker’s mental ideas. The
meaning of an expression has to do with
its use in a language game. A language
game is a practical social activity. The
term denotes something wider than linguistic behavior. The meaning of the
word “pain”, for example, has to do with
the activity of comforting each other.
When two people say they attach the
same meaning to an expression in a particular situation, this signifies that they
feel successful in their actions at that particular time. When something goes
wrong, on the other hand, people say that
they misunderstand each other or that
they attach different meanings to the
words they use. Our use of the word
“meaning” is thus related to an infinite
number of things that “may go wrong”. It
is related to the whole contingent context
of use and to culturally determined linguistic skills. This, according to Wittgenstein, is nothing that can be fully described with words. Searle, on the other
hand, believes that social use of language

can be fully described by a finite set of
rules constituting the social institutions
that make certain speech acts, like promising, possible and meaningful. From a
Wittgensteinian perspective, speech act
theory focuses on certain standard ways
in which communication can fail. Such a
theory can be useful for several purposes, but it can never be a solution to philosophical problems. It can never function as a complete theory of meaning.
Wittgenstein saw philosophy as a
kind of therapy. Many philosophical
problems arise because we become confused when we face formulations of constitutive elements of a language game.
These philosophical problems, such as
the problem of meaning, can be dissolved (not solved) if we reconsider obvious and overlooked aspects of our language usage. According to Wittgenstein,
philosophy should not construct new
systematic theories. His philosophy is
anti-theoretical in this respect. His “theory” of meaning consists of the view that
there can be no theories of meaning.
A philosophy with many similarities
with Wittgenstein’s is that of Derrida
(see (Staten 1984) for a comparison).
Derrida explicitly discusses speech act
theory in (Derrida 1988), in which he focuses on the impossibility of making a
strict separation between normal and
non-normal forms of language usage.
Even accepting Wittgenstein’s view
of philosophy (which of course is open to
criticism) and of meaning, where does
this leave us when creating a theoretical
basis for the design and development of
IT-artifacts? Will our research questions
dissolve by means of a Wittgensteinian
therapy, or could we benefit from having
systematic theories about work and communication? That work (and linguistic
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actions in general) is contingent and situated in character does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that speech act
theory is useless in designing IT-artifacts. It may lead to a renewed insight
that speech act theory is only an abstraction focusing on certain aspects of language and disregarding others. This, in
turn, may lead to a renewed examination
of speech act theory and how it can be
applied.
As mentioned above, it is important
to be clear about how speech act theory
is used to solve new problems in its new
field. In this new context, people are not
concerned with abstract philosophical
problems of meaning. One major difference is that linguists and philosophers
are passive observers, describing social
interaction, while IT-developers are active designers of such interaction.
From a Wittgensteinian perspective,
any attempt to produce a theory of meaning fails, simply because it is a theory.
This is, however, not applicable to the
use of speech act theory in IT-design. It
is a reasonable criticism against speech
act theory as a philosophical theory, but
not as a practical theory to be used in a
design situation. On the contrary, this
type of philosophical consideration can
be used to question the relevance of linguistics and philosophy to IT-design, in
the first place. Our task is not to search
for an ultimate “true” philosophy or linguistic theory about communication or
social interaction. Instead, we should
turn our focus to the concrete and unique
problems in our own field. The crucial
question concerns what needs to be articulated about work and communication to
improve current praxis in the development and usage of IT. We also need to
distinguish between the needs for articu-

lation among researchers, systems developers and users.
However, there are situations in
which we believe appealing to the situated character of communication and work
is a relevant way to problematize the role
of theories as such in our field. We will
here give three examples of such situations. Firstly, the argument is relevant
whenever a theory claims to give an objective, absolute, and final account of human interaction. As such the argument
concerns our attitude towards theoretical
issues in information systems (IS) research. Is there a positivistic truth about
work and communication, or are all theories sufficient and useful only for certain purposes? Unfortunately the IS-field
is dominated by commercial interests
tending to strengthen and popularize
such positivistic claims. This, in turn, reverberates in academic debates. It would
be disappointing, however, if the discussion about the applicability of speech act
theory were to become dominated by
commercial exaggerations. Secondly,
there is the problem of a rationalistic design of work, which is discussed below.
To what extent is it possible and desirable to design work? For whom is it desirable? Who should be the designer? This
is one of the major concerns of Suchman
(1994). Thirdly, if there exists a need to
design and to plan work, how should
such a design be achieved? Through formal requirements analysis, abstract modeling, and theoretical analysis or through
practical tests and a continuous designuse iteration? In what respect do we need
to theorize about work? There are approaches within the IT-field that are directly or indirectly influenced by the philosophy of Wittgenstein, such that Ehn’s
tools approach (Ehn 1988). Here the em-

J. Ljungberg & P. Holm 36

http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol8/iss1/4

8

Ljungberg and Holm: Speech Acts On Trial

phasis lies on practical involvement in
work during IT design and development.
In this respect Ehn and others share an
anti-theoretical attitude with Wittgenstein, but from a more practical point of
view. Of course, the need for a particular
development method varies with different kinds of work settings. A major problem when designing IT artifacts is finding a balance between theoretical reflection and practical involvement in work.
Note that none of the points raised
above are specifically about speech act
theory. They can be applied to many development methods that use formal and
abstract description techniques to describe work activities, such as petri-nets,
flow-charts, state-transition diagrams,
and information-flow diagrams. The usage of these methods tacitly assumes that
work should be designed, and performed
under a set of constraints.
To conclude, observe that an appeal
to the situated character of work (and of
human actions in general) is related to all
three themes presented in this paper: it
has been an inspiration to search for new
theories; it can be used to problematize
the role of theories as such; and it is related to the problems associated with a
rationalistic design of work.
3.2. The Insufficiency of Speech Act
Theory
In this subsection, we will give an overview of the concrete shortcomings of
speech act theory and present extensions
and alternative approaches. As mentioned above, the situated character of
work may play a role here as well. It can
be viewed as one of several phenomena
a theory of work should capture. One
such example is the discussion about the
articulation of work that incorporates a

notion of how work articulation is needed to aid situated work activities. Another example is Suchman (1987), who sets
out to investigate interactional competencies and their social and material
foundations.
Articulation work
The concept of articulation work (Gerson & Star 1986, Schmidt 1993) was developed to handle the fact that cooperating actors, have to articulate (divide, allocate, coordinate, schedule, mesh, interrelate et cetera) who is doing what,
where, when, how, by means of what,
and under which constraints. The dimensions of articulation work include actors,
responsibilities, tasks, activities, conceptual structures, information resources,
material resources, technical resources
and infra-structural resources.
Articulation work goes beyond a
communicative approach. In several respects it has a broader scope than speech
act theory. However, there is not necessarily a conflict between the two, if the
latter is viewed as one of many ways in
which we can articulate communicative
aspects of work.
Discourse versus Conversation
Much of the sharper critique of the
speech act approach in IT-design emanates from an ethnomethodological tradition. Even if there is some common
theoretical ground of the language/action
perspective and ethnomethodological
approaches, at least if we refer to the
original hermeneutic arguments developed by Winograd & Flores (1986), they
are emanating from fundamentally different traditions in the study of pragmatics. These traditions, discourse analysis
and conversation analysis,1 represent
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two different approaches to the study of
language usage in linguistic research
(Levinson 1983), but when speech act
theory is adopted for IT-design, the terms
“discourse” and “conversation” are used
as synonyms. According to linguistic terminology, the conversation-for-action
schema would be called the “discoursefor-action schema.”
Discourse analysis applies traditional methods and theoretical principles of
formal linguistics as rules and wellformed formulas to larger units than the
sentence. By isolating a set of basic units
of discourse (e.g. speech act types), and
formulating concatenation rules over
these, well-formed sequences of these
basic units are defined as coherent discourses. Discourse is, in this tradition,
just a larger unit than the sentence, on
which the same techniques can be used
to delimit well-formed sequences of constituents from ill-formed ones (Levinson
1979). This approach covers both work
on text grammars (which is outside the
scope of this paper) and various works
on speech acts.
A discourse may (in the sense it is
most commonly used in work on IT-design by Flores et al. and Lyytinen et al.)
be viewed as a generic, goal-oriented office task. It is a globally managed sequence of communicative actions
(speech acts), forming a coherent and
predetermined course of action leading
to a goal.
Conversation analysis, on the other
hand, emerged with an approach to sequence in social interaction avoiding the
restricted formalisms that constrict the
speech act notion of interaction. Conversation analysis is an empirical approach,
rooted in ethnomethodology, contrary to
the more schematic theory construction

of speech act theory. The conversational
paradigm denotes a more or less informal way of talking, where two or more
co-present participants freely alternate in
speaking as in face-to-face communication. However, many studies have also
been undertaken in formal or institutional settings, where the course of turns in
the interaction is more predetermined
and rule governed, e.g. courts, churches,
schools, hospitals (see for example
(Drew & Heritage 1992)). This tradition
has also been used as a foundation for ITdesign, as in human-computer interaction (Suchman 1987), and Computer
supported cooperative work (Bowers
1993, Bowers & Churcher 1988).
According to work in conversation
analysis, conversational sequences are
rarely structured in the way indicated by
the conversation-for-action schema, i.e.
request - promise - assertion - declaration. Instead, certain kinds of utterances
seem to go together in pairs, like question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance et cetera (Levinson 1983). This
kind of pairing, adjacency pairs, is an
important characteristic of conversation.
Utterances that go together with requests
to form adjacency pairs, are not promises, but compliances or rejections. In
many situations the most natural response to a request is complying with it
(or rejecting it) without any promising
taking place in between. Furthermore in
real conversations it is common to issue
a pre-request before a request is uttered.
The pre-request functions as an initial
check whether certain preconditions obtain. A pre-request could also function as
an indirect request.
A conversation is guided by turn taking conventions which regulates when
one person stops talking and another
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starts, i.e. who may speak when. While
the course of action in a discourse is globally managed, by means of the constituting rules of a well-formed discourse,
the course of action in a conversation is
locally managed by the participants. Local control is maximized for both the distribution of turns and the selection of
topic, that is “who talks and what gets
talked about is decided then and there, by
the participants in the conversation,
through their collaborative construction
of the conversation course” (Suchman
1987).
In contrast to a globally managed
system, turn taking conventions organize
just the transition from one speaker to the
next. There is no predetermined order in
which the turns should be issued. A locally managed conversation is thus a
highly interactive phenomenon. The opposite of free conversation is found in rituals or ceremonies, where almost every
move and every utterance is pre-allocated (e.g. a wedding ceremony). Here both
content, speaker and turns of utterances
are determined beforehand.
An office procedure may well be anywhere in the scale between strict globally controlled discourses and free unrestricted conversations. The contact
with a customer may follow a strict predefined format (as a kind of generic discourse), or there may be room for creativity and improvization. In designing
work procedures and IT-support for contracting and negotiation with customers
we need to handle both situations. Arguably, the conversation-for-action schema
can handle only strict predetermined sequences of speech acts.

The multi-functional nature of
communicative acts
Another line of criticism against the
Searlian speech act theory concerns multi-functionality. According to Allwood
(1980), our common-sense classification
of communicative actions shows systematic ambiguities. These can be seen as instances of a general ambiguity in our ordinary conception of action. Allwood
lists four factors commonly used as criteria for classification:
i. The intentional phenomena governing the behavior
ii. The form of the behavior
iii. The result which is achieved through
the behavior
iv. The context in which the behavior
occurs
The ambiguity arises in two ways. Firstly, we could classify an utterance from
several different points of view, i.e. as regards (i) - (iv). Secondly, as regards (i),
Allwood considers a communicative act
to be a parcel of communicative intentions. He claims that multi-intentionality
is the normal case in communication.
Further discussion on how Searle’s classification of speech acts fails, can be
found in (Allwood 1977, 1980).
To this we may add that the interpretation and classification of a specific
speech act in a specific situation could
result from negotiations among the involved parties. The speaker’s intention
may be vague and open to how the listener responds. This phenomenon has been
studied in conversation analysis (mentioned above).
In the conversation-for-action schema, a one-to-one mapping between specific utterances and illocutionary acts is
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taken for granted. A message will either
count as a request, a counter offer, a rejection, a promise, a declaration, et cetera. In this context, however, the one-toone mapping is designed. People adhere
to a predefined schema. In a specific
sense it is decided on beforehand how
the actions should be interpreted. (This
is, of course, true only to the extent that
people use the system in the intended
way.) Once again we must consider the
difference between describing and designing social interaction. In a way the
problems inherent in the one-to-one
mapping per se disappear. However, the
discussion about multi-functionality is
now turned into the question of what specific classification of speech acts is needed in a design situation? Is it reasonable
to have only one classification? If so,
which one should be chosen?
The taxonomy in the conversationfor-action schema is not motivated with
an explicit theoretical discussion about
alternative classification criteria. Rather
different speech act types are presented
as self evident. In other approaches, such
as the Sampo method (Auramäki 1988,
Auramäki et al. 1988, 1992a, 1992b), the
Searlian classification is largely adopted
as is. Little is added or changed to the
theory to make it fit the context of IT-design. Practical experience with the Sampo method, has lead to the conclusion
that concrete classification of particular
speech acts depends on the perspectives
one may have in different situations.
All in all, we conclude that a theoretical discussion about the most reasonable classification criteria of speech acts
for a design situation has not yet been
sufficiently addressed.

The limited notion of context
The Searlian speech act theory is also
criticized for its limited possibilities of
referring to the wider social context in
which the conversation is embedded. In
speech act theory one focuses on the performer of an idealized utterance. It has a
sender perspective, rather than a receiver
or social-interactional perspective. The
illocutionary act is constituting the core
of meaning. Meaning is fundamentally
emergent from the utterance, and speech
act theory is therefore claimed by some
authors to be drastically decontextualized (Drew & Heritage 1992).
A theory of speech acts is basically
concerned with mapping utterances into
speech act categories. This mapping may
rely on complex contextual cues, related
to socially or culturally constituted activities where language plays a specialized
role. Examples of such culturally identified activity types, or speech events, are
teaching, job interviews and conferences. The notion of context may be quite
complex and how many and which variables that should be taken into account is
an open question (see for example (Levinson 1979, 1983, Lyons 1977)). The
conversation-for-action schema, can be
seen as representing one such activity
type, i.e. the contracting speech event between customer and supplier.
Social roles
According to Flores et al. the typical office comprises a structure of recurrent
conversation patterns associated with
formally declared roles: group manager,
assistant, programmer et cetera (Flores et
al. 1988). The role structure is assumed
to be stable and not under negotiation or
change. Positions and power relations
among the users are also assumed to be
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stable. This view leads us back to a notion of organizations as bureaucracies,
and away from the powerful view of organizations as networks of commitments, also put forth by Flores et al.
Should we design for stable structures, or should we design for change? If
we consider language to be social, intersubjective, and a means through which
we create our social reality, a language
oriented view on design should have a
more dynamic and nuanced concept of
roles. New roles emerge that mature and
institutionalize and old ones are reshaped continuously. Just by intervening
in work with computer artifacts new
roles are formed. This formation of roles
must be taken into account in designing
work and IT-support, since computer
mediated communication will obviously
play an important role in this formation
process.
Cognitivism and individualism
A classical problem within philosophy
of language concerns the relation between the private and the socially public
world. Beliefs and intentions belong to
the private realm. Conventions belong to
the social and public realm. The problem
is: How can we talk about intentions in
the first place? What do we mean by
that? In speech act theory, both intentions and social conventions play crucial
roles. In philosophy of language it is often claimed that we should only refer to
public items, when explaining our use of
language. Language, according to this
view, is an inherently social phenomenon. Wittgenstein’s private language argument is held by many to be conclusive
on this point.
However, many people find it counter-intuitive not to take intentionality

into account. Maybe Wittgenstein can
guide us further on this point, in illustrating why it feels counter-intuitive both to
eliminate references to the mental and to
take these references as literally refering
to something behind, within, or beyond
the body. He says the body is a mirror of
the soul. We can not talk about either one
of them, without the other. The concept
of body and the concept of soul are mutually dependent on each other. References to mental events can not be understood properly, without bodily manifestations. At the same time, we can not understand these bodily manifestations,
unless we interpret them as manifestations of something mental.
While the philosophical problem of
mental vocabulary is too complex to address here, a question that is relevant to
consider, is whether appealing to intentions is crucial when using speech act
theory in the design of IT-artifacts. This
usage may very well unite with the currently popular cognitivistic tendency in
many branches of computer science.
However, we believe social and conventional aspects of communication must be
more relevant to consider in the design of
IT support for organizational communication. (This is also stressed by
Winograd & Flores (1986).) A heavy focus on intentionality may lead to a narrow individualistic perspective.
Organizational agents
The Searlian speech act theory can be
criticized for having a too individualistic
focus also in another sense. In IT-design
it is relevant to consider social groups
and organizations as responsible agents.
A promise may create a commitment for
an organization or a department, and not
for the individual performing the speech
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act. We thus need to introduce a notion of
“representatives”, in the sense that a
sales person is a representative for an organization. This means that the sales person acts “on behalf of” the organization.
When this person accepts a customer order, a commitment is made for the whole
organization. This commitment may, in
turn, be administered by creating “sub
commitments” internally within the organization, where one department is
committed to another.
In a way, this adaptation of speech act
theory has already begun. In the Action
Workflow approach, a workflow may
have several sub flows. Some of these
sub flows correspond to sub commitments (Medina-Mora et al. 1992). In addition to this, the Sampo method attempts to illustrate the relationship between different commitments in the notion of “coordination of commitments”
(Auramäki et al. 1988). However, we believe that this needs further elaboration.
In both methods the notions of commissives and workflow commitments, respectively, are primarily based on Searle’s individualistic perspective.

utterance “Watch out, or I’ll give you
1000 dollars.” may function well as a
joke, but not as a sincere threat.)
This separation of the concern for information content and information context is related to a set of modeling-administrative problems. If we combine the
two, there would be redundancy problems. Consider for example a process
model specifying that secretaries send
invoices to customers. Consider then a
model of invoice documents. The latter
model would probably reduplicate parts
of the former, since an invoice typically
contains information about its sender
and its receiver. In (Holm 1996) it is
pointed out that any approach combining
models of information content with
models of information context demands
a non-conventional formalization of,
e.g., ER-models. It is also pointed out
that we need an analogous expressiveness regarding processes. We should be
able to relate support functions in the ITsystem in various ways to user behavior.
In (Holm 1994, 1996, Holm & Ljungberg 1996) a modeling framework is presented that meets these requirements.

Propositional content
In the conversation-for-action approach,
the information content of speech acts is
ignored (Schmidt 1993). The schema focuses on who is communicating when,
and not on what is communicated. The
method does not, for instance, include
ready-made schemas or templates for
documents or databases to be used. In the
Searlian speech act theory, on the other
hand, the notion of propositional content
plays a crucial role. It is, for example
pointed out that the information content
of a threat must not describe something
beneficial for the hearer. (That is why the

3.3. Problems with a Rationalistic
Design of Work
We now turn to the second major theme
in the criticism of speech act theory,
namely problems with a rationalistic design of work. This notion needs some
clarification. In a way, all social activities are designed. We are always affected
by a set of social conventions and rules
in our actions. In another sense, all activities are situated and performed with a
certain freedom and responsibility. However, what we aim at here is a practical
characterization of work situations, relevant for IT-design. We build on the intu-
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itive notion that work is routinized,
planned, and structured to different degrees in different situations. What is
more important is that an organizational
change process introducing new IT-artifacts, often calls for new decisions regarding the degree and character of the
structure, plans, and control of work, i.e.
how work is designed. Our concern in
this section has to do with the problems
if, how, and for whom it is desirable to
design work, and how such issues affect
the aptness of using speech act theory.
A control-oriented way of working
It has been claimed that the conversation-for-action approach leads to a control-oriented way of viewing work. It has
been criticized for being a rigid form of
controlling the workflow, forcing users
to perform their work in a certain way,
with no possibility of changin or editing
the sequence of speech acts. Criticism by
Suchman (1994) concludes that: “the
adoption of speech act theory as a foundation for system design carries with it
an agenda of discipline and control over
organization members’ actions”. In the
light of this critique, the hermeneutic argument developed in (Winograd &
Flores 1986) turns out to be a traditional
control-oriented positivist perspective in
practice. The implication of this criticism is that the conversation-for-action
metaphor is unable to articulate work in
other terms than obligations. It is only
valid in work domains characterized by
explicit command and control structures
(Schmidt 1993).
In this context, it is worth noting that
a certain confusion exists as to how the
conversation-for-action schema should
be interpreted and on what grounds it
should be evaluated. It is claimed to rep-

resent a universal structure “implicit in
all interactions where actions are being
coordinated among people” (Winograd
1994, p. 192). This seems to imply that
using the schema is neutral. It does not
essentially change the way coordination
takes place. However, the reference to
the universal character of the schema is
problematic in several ways. All coordination may be theorizable in these terms,
but in what sense are we dealing with an
“implictly existing phenomena”? Even if
this is accepted, there is a need to discuss
the effects of making it explicit (Suchman 1994, Lynch 1995). Again we must
make a clearer separation between a descriptive and a normative use of the schema, or as Lynch puts it, “between naturalistic and instrumental justifications”
of the schema (Lynch 1995).
Despite the resort to the universal
character of the schema, we find many
examples of an instrumental perspective
in (Winograd 1994), where Winograd
states that the schema should be viewed
as a practical building block in design
and not as the ultimate theory about human coordination. He also admits that
the explicit representation of such coordination is appropriate only in some situations. Moreover, when the schema is
used in industry, it is accompanied with a
set of very specific claims concerning
the organizational effects of using it. It is
claimed that introducing one responsible
person for every workflow leads to better
customer service. It is also claimed, in
the area of Business process re-engineering, that it increases organizational effectiveness to impose customer and performer roles also in situations where
these labels are not naturally employed.
An example of this would be to view the
relation between a student and his/her
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supervisor as a customer-performer relation (in any direction). One of the most
debated claims is perhaps that the usage
of explicitly identified, clear and unambiguous speech acts are generally preferable and leads to more effective coordination.
We believe the issues raised by Suchman are important and relevant when we
discuss the design and usage of IT. However, it is important to separate the very
process of articulation, categorization
and work design in general, which addresses the usage of speech act theory,
from the usage of the conversation-foraction schema. The schema is more narrowly applicable than speech act theory,
in the sense that it assumes two specific
social roles—that of a performer and a
customer, and one generic purpose of
communication—to administer commitments. It may be claimed that Searle’s
theory is also applicable in situations
with other social roles, for example that
of a tutor and student, or in situations
with other purposes of communication,
such as when describing a discussion between a customer and a performer during
work performance. The schema is something new and unique. The claim that it is
a central coordinating structure for human organizations rests on theoretical
assumptions that go beyond original
speech act theory.
The criticism also needs to be more
precise as to what it is in the use of the
language/action approach that aligns
with a managerial perspective (as Suchman claims it does) and in what respects
certain interests can be classified as managerial. Exactly what is it in the usage of
the conversation-for-action schema that
leads to a control-oriented way of viewing work? Is it related to general prob-

lems of creating categorizations of some
sort, or is it related to the particular categories in the schema? Is it the very idea
of structuring the communication process or is it the use of this particular structure? Is it how the schema is used by
practitioners or how it is intended to be
used by the original authors (Winograd
1994)? Is it how it is used in the Coordinator or in the Action Workflow system?
Is it the usage of Searle’s theoretical concepts? We believe the problem at hand is
related to all of the above mentioned issues, but in different ways. To some extent it concerns concrete technical details
regarding how the schema is implemented and used in contemporary Workflow
management tools. Here are some reflections: as regards the use of the schema in
the Action Workflow system, it is based
on an assumption that there should exist
predefined roles with strictly defined responsibilities. The course of actions is
strictly defined according to a fixed
schema. Everything people do is supposed to be initiated by a request from
someone else. The schema is assumed to
be globally managed. A potential defence of the schema, in this context, is
that it is only the course of actions that is
predefined. The particular decisions are
not necessarily controlled by strict rules.
Since it is easy to change the schema, it
can also be used with flexibility as regards changes of the communication
structure.
To a certain extent, the above criticism of the schema has a narrow focus
on how it is used today, and fails to discuss other potential uses of it. Even if the
schema is not regarded as generally applicable to all coordination in organizations, this does not mean it is worthless.
Moreover, the schema needs not to be
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applied restrictively. For example, it can
be used as a reference model in a design
situation. This approach is taken in
(Holm 1994) where an extended version
of the schema is applied to routinized ordering procedures. Many traditional database applications mirror a communication structure similar to this schema.
These databases typically contain information about customer orders, order verifications, deliveries, invoices, payments, et cetera. In traditional modeling
methods all this would be described in
terms of entities and relations. In such
situations the generic schema can be
used to reveal a recurring structure regarding relations between organizational
speech acts, the information content in a
database, and the dynamic behavior of
IT-artifacts. This is perfectly doable,
without applying the schema to all organizational coordination. One can also
argue that this would not be to impose a
new and foreign categorization of the organizational actions. Rather the schema
is used to make explicit certain relationships between already existing concepts
and categories.
As mentioned above, a part of this
discussion is not specific to speech act
theory per se. It concerns the general
problem of knowing when and why work
should be designed in the first place, e.g.
whether certain activities need to be
planned, structured, explicitly categorized, and defined, at all. The following
list contains a set of work characteristics
making a strict rationalistic design of
work less desirable. The more desirable
these characteristics are, the more people
must work with a certain amount of freedom and flexibility.

•

Rich utilization and development of
human skills and continuous learning.

•

Rich utilization and development of
social competence and responsibility.

•

Rich and diversified human interaction.

We believe most organizations contain a
set of activities that are desirable to routinize and control. There is, for instance, a
huge difference between the task of
sending invoices and that of portfolio
management in a bank. In many situations there are also conflicts between
management perspectives and worker
perspectives regarding these issues.
However, even though global control
and planning is a typical example of a
managerial interest, managers are not the
only ones having such interests. To a certain degree it comes with the very idea of
organizing work in organizations. A certain conformity in practice is also a prerequisite for using language and taking
part in social activities in general. Increased global conformity in categorization is not necessarily only a managerial
concern. Nor is there necessarily a conflict between increased global conformity and a need for autonomy and flexibility. We can of course always theorize
about political conflicts in the process of
articulation, but in what situations is this
really important?
One part of the discussion about the
applicability of speech act theory concerns situations where routinization and
control are more generally desirable and
less politically loaded, such as in ordering procedures in large organizations.
The application of speech act theory in
this realm is something different from an
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attempt to describe and design all kinds
of organizational communication in
terms of speech acts.
Another crucial question is how a
particular design of work should be
viewed: as a social contract, a management directive, or a suggestion and a resource for a situated action? How should
it be used in the concrete work practice?
Finally, but not least: Who should be the
designer? However, these questions are
of a more general character and can be
raised in relation to any and all types of
development method.
Reshaping power and authority
relations
A related criticism of Searlian speech act
theory is that of Habermas (1984). He
presents a theory of communicative actions, where each action is viewed as
containing three claims: a claim to truth,
a claim to justice, and a claim to sincerity. An action succeeds if the hearer accepts all three claims. If this is not the
case, the participants may enter a negotiation about the validity of a claim. Besides communicative actions, there are
strategic actions. When involved in strategic actions, participants strive for their
own private goals. When involved in
communicative actions, on the other
hand, they are oriented towards mutual
agreement.
This theory is claimed to be superior
to Searle’s theory in several respects, and
consequences for the design of IT-artifacts are discussed by Dietz & Widdershoven (1992). It is suggested that the
conversation-for-action schema should
be extended with an account of strategic
action and negotiation of validity claims.
Habermas apparently considers more
functions of language than does Searle.

However, the question is how Habermas’
insights should be used in the design of
IT artifacts. Here we face again the problem of importing ideas and concepts
from a passive descriptive theory into an
active design situation. As mentioned
above, the contemporary use of the conversation-for-action schema has been
criticized for not considering the effects
of making things explicit, (Lynch 1995,
Suchman 1994). The argument that the
schema is a “true” theory about human
coordination is insufficient to justify its
use in design. When discussing Habermas, there is a risk that we make the
same mistake all over again, but with another theory. The basic argument in (Dietz & Widdershoven 1992) is that since
Habermas’ theory is “truer” than Searle’s, the latter is also more preferable as
a foundation for IT design. But this is obviously not true as a general statement.
When it comes to strategic actions and
negotiation about validity claims, the
benefits of being explicit about one’s
communicative intentions are even more
questionable. What would the effects be?
Should we stimulate people to question
each other’s work roles and formal positions? When is this fruitful? Is it good to
structure and formalize such communication? To what extent, when, and in
what ways should conflicting goals be
made more visible? Should you explicitly classify your statements so that other
persons know when you are striving towards your own private goals? Is this doable? If you are about to cheat someone,
will this be done more effectively if you
utter the formula “I hereby cheat you”?
An alternative approach, which we
would like to suggest, is applying Habermas’ theory as a vehicle for reflection,
rather than using his taxonomy in con-
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crete design. In this context, insights regarding the nature of strategic and communicative actions could be used to understand if, why, and how communication at work should be designed at all. If
we expect conflicts among work groups,
is it reasonable to strive for consensus regarding a specific design of work and
communication, or is it more reasonable
to leave this issue open? On the other
hand, it may be preferable in such situations to introduce formal relations in order to avoid unnecessary and reoccurring
disputes.

4. Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed the applicability of using speech act theory as a
foundation for the design of IT-artifacts
for work and communication. We have
elaborated on two themes to which various criticisms and needs for extensions
are related: firstly the problems with theoretical abstractions in general and in
particular, and secondly the problems
with a rationalistic design of work.
The following list is a framework for
understanding the various short-comings of the current use of the conversation-for-action schema in the CSCW-area. It may serve as a guide to which situations the schema should be applied.
•

Is there a need for a rationalistic
design of work?
•

Is there a need for flexibility in
work performance?

•

Is there a need for flexibility as
regards social roles and authority
relations?

•

To what degree do we expect
cooperation or conflicts among
different work groups?

•

What specific social roles exist?

•

What is the general purpose of communication?

The first point in the framework concerns the general problem of design, as
discussed above. The problem of work
design versus flexibility is related to certain characteristics of work situations:
rich utilization and development of human skills and continuous learning, rich
utilization and development of social
competence and responsibility, and rich
and diversified human interaction. If
these characteristics are desirable, people must work and communicate with a
certain amount of freedom and flexibility concerning work procedures as well as
social roles and authority relations. As
the conversation-for-action schema is
currently used, it results in a restriction
on communication structure. This is also
true for the current use of speech act theory in IT-design in general. Hence the
need for not having a rationalistic design
of work, in the above sense, leads to a
failure for both the conversation-for-action schema and the use of speech act
theory in general. It also leads to a questioning of the assumption that there
should be fixed social roles with clearly
defined responsibilities. Moreover, if
people are not striving for mutual understanding in communication, if there are
conflicts and people attempt to manipulate each other, then Searle’s taxonomy
is insufficient. Here we may also ask
why, and how this type of communication should be structured and designed, if
it should be so at all?

J. Ljungberg & P. Holm 47

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 1996

19

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 8 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 4

The design, structure, planning, and
control of work is not a one-dimensional
problem. Many things may be structured, such as work and communication
procedures, social roles, responsibilities,
work and communication content. The
conversation-for-action schema focuses
on the communication structure. Searle
had a more explicit focus also on the
propositional (information) content of
speech acts.
We have also discussed the questions: how shall the design be achieved,
through abstract analysis or through
practical test and design-use iteration?
Who should be the designer? In many
tools based on the conversation-for-action schema it is easy to change the schema and the behavior of the system. We
believe this purely technical feature
plays an important role for the acceptance of these tools, since it allows for a
continuous reflection and re-design of
existing work practices. This feature has,
of course, nothing to do with speech act
theory per se. Moreover, the current use
of the conversation-for-action schema
assumes that the communication should
be globally managed, which is another
type of restriction.
In addition to the above, the conversation-for-action schema rests upon a set
of specific assumptions about the social
roles (customer and performer) and the
purpose of communication (to administrate organizational commitments). The
schema will hence also fail if there are
(and should be) other social roles or other purposes of communication. The
Searlian speech act theory is more general in this respect. Finally, the schema can
be criticized also in situations where customers and performers communicate in
order to administer commitments. Peo-

ple may want to edit the sequence of
speech acts. This criticism may be remedied by using the schema less restrictively. It may, for example be used as an editable reference model in a design situation.
In the discussion about the applicability of speech act theory as a foundation for IT-design, it is important to be
aware of the adaptations the original
speech act theory has undergone, when
applied in its new field. In this paper we
have mentioned the following existing
changes and needs for further adaptations: (1) A new focus on relations between organizational commitments. (2)
The need for further elaboration of the
notion of organizational commitments,
as opposed to commitments of individuals. (3) The need for further discussions
about alternative classification criteria
for design. (In the conversation-for-action schema the speech act types are
treated as primitives, and the Searlian
classification is abandoned.) We have
also mentioned, (4) the possibility of extending the speech act concept with a notion of situation types, where “customersupplier communication for action”, is
but one example.
Current work on using theories of
communicative action as a foundation
for IT-design is, in our opinion, only in
its initial phases. What has hitherto been
explored is only a small portion of its full
potential.

Notes
1
Note that this is a simplification. There are several
approaches within or related to these traditions, e.g.
interactional social linguistics and ethnography of
communication are closely related to Conversation
analysis (see for example (Schiffrin 1994)).
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